Judicial liberals don’t dispute that a judge must bow to the “social will”—they simply divine it differently. As one liberal Justice declared, the Constitution “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”The first sentence of this paragraph is true. The second is false. The justice being quoted was Chief Justice Earl Warren, a Republican who almost single-handedly revived the practice of constitutional review by the Supreme Court, some two decades after the FDR regime had silenced the court by the threat of "packing" its bench with compliant Socialists. Earlier in his article, Bowden writes:
Judges must never bow to social opinion, historical or current, when exercising judicial review. For example, laws that institutionalized government discrimination against blacks in military service and voting deserved to be struck down, even if political majorities in both the Founders’ generation and modern times favored such rights violations.Yes, they did deserve to be struck down. And who did the striking down? The same Chief Justice Earl Warren, who later in the same article becomes the un-named "liberal Justice" - one among those who "don’t dispute that a judge must bow to the “social will”—they simply divine it differently."
The quoted phrase, "evolving standards of decency," was applied, when written by Warren (in Trop v. Dulles, in 1958) not to the Constitution as a whole - as Bowden misleadingly insinuates - but to the meaning of "cruel and unusual" punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. "Cruel" and "unusual." Both of these concepts are, as Ayn Rand would say, contextual. Their meaning depends unavoidably on the context of, among other things, "evolving standards of decency." Surely an Objectivist, of all people, should know better than to mistake contextuality for social metaphysics.
What would be the effect of such an argument on a literate reader who does not already agree with Bowden's conclusion? The context of Warren's opinion is not particularly obscure (and I happen to be an inventor, scientist, and teacher of Information Systems; I never took so much as one course in law, much less in the history of constitutional law.) It would not be unreasonable to take, whatever was argued for in this manner, less than seriously. When, if ever, did an accurate idea need to be put forward with so bad an argument? In context, a sufficiently bad argument for almost any idea becomes, in its effect on the literate reader, an argument against it.
The Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights is a very good idea. I hope that in time its output will improve. But before that happens, it will need to do some heavy lifting in quality control.
3 comments:
> "Both of these concepts are, as Ayn Rand would say, contextual. Their meaning depends unavoidably on the context of, among other things, 'evolving standards of decency'."
I am unsure of what you are saying.
1. Should not the meaning of any (nonaxiomatic) concept depend in part on the objective context--that is, the context established by drawing conclusions logically from facts of reality--and not on the presumably subjective "evolving standards" of a particular society at a particular time?
My interpretation of "evolving standards"--as I usually hear the phrase used--is that it takes changes in society as a given, which is not an objective standard.
I am not a lawyer, so perhaps I have misunderstood.
2. If I have understood you correctly, you seem to be saying you think Warren thought "evolving standards" applied only to the particular issue at hand, punishment. Do you happen to know why he did not think it applied anywhere else in the constitution?
I am curious to know what principle applied, in his view.
Burgess,
Your comment seems to assume that proper standards of decency are somehow independent of context. But in the eighteenth century very few Americans traveled abroad, so the effect of not being able to get a passport would not have made much difference in this man's life. In the twentieth century, the prospect of being permanently confined within the borders of one country, or else becoming unable to return home if he ever ventured to visit places that Americans now routinely traveled to, became a significant impediment to living a normal human life. To stay connected to reality, the standards of decency with respect to just punishment must change - evolve - to track changes in the objective impact of the punishment, relative to changes in the social context: taking a vacation abroad, something that in the eighteenth century hardly any American did, had become a part of normal American life.
In general, the meaning of concepts rightly evolves with the growth of human knowledge (for example, homosexual relationships, once wrongly thought to be unnatural, are now known to be perfectly natural for homosexuals) and with changes in economic and technological conditions. Not just affordable international travel, but electronic communication, using a computer or a car and so on, are things that now enhance human life so profoundly, that being deprived of them by force becomes a significant burden and punishment. With changes in knowledge and in existential conditions of human life, behavioral standards that fail to evolve thereby become non-objective. (The underlying epistemological issues are addressed by Tara Smith in her article on Originalism - you may wish to google for the PDF.)
> "(The underlying epistemological issues are addressed by Tara Smith in her article on Originalism - you may wish to google for the PDF.)"
Is the following what you are referring to?
Tara Smith, "Why Originalism Won't Die...Mistakes in...Theories of Judicial Interpretation," Duke J. of Const. Law, V. 2, '07; 159-215.
I have added her intriguing essay (which I have read in small part only, so far) to the list of possible study groups for Study Groups for Objectivists (SGO).
Thanks for the lead.
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